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ABSTRACT
Debt neutrality is said to occur if, given a program for public
spending on current goods and services over time, the real equilibrium of the
economy (private consumption, investment, relative prices, etc.) is
independent of the pattern of government borrowing and lump—sum taxation over
time. The paper brings together work of Blanchard on individual uncertain
lifetimes and debt neutrality and Weil on population growth and debt
neutrality. It is shown that there will be debt neutrality if and only if the
sum of the rate of growth of population and the individual probability of
death equals zero. If this condition holds, non—zero rates of growth of labor
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t.Introduction
This paper reconsiders the necessary arid sufficient conditions for
debt neutrality. There is debt neutrality if, given a program for public
expenditure on current goods and services over time, the real equilibrium of
the economy is not affected by a change in the pattern over time of Lump—sum
taxes. If there is debt neutrality for instance, the substitution of
borrowing today for lump—sum taxation today (followed by such further changes
in the time path of future lump—sum taxes as are required for maintaining
government solvency) does not affect the current and future behavior of
private consumption and capital formation.
I consider this issue in a simple closed economy growth model. There
is a single produced commodity which can be consumed privately, consumed
publicly or used in private capital formation. Population and labor supply
grow at the constant exogenous instantaneous proportional rate n. Labor—
augmenting technical hange occurs atthe constant exogenous instantaneous
proportional rate it.Privateconsumption behavior is modeled following the
Yaari—Blanchard uncertain lifetimes approach (Yaari [1965], Blarichard [1984,
1985]). The constant instantaneous probability of death of each individual is
X￿O.
The paper combines the results of Blanchard [1984, 1985] about debt
neutrality and uncertain lifetimes and of Weil [1985] about debt neutrality
and population growth and completes the triad by considering the implications
of productivity growth for debt neuerality.
Blanchard showed that uncertain life;:imes (x >0)are sufficient for
absence of debt neutrality. They drive a wedge between effective (risk—
adjusted) private sector discount rates and government discount rates. The
future flow of resources expected to be available to those private agentsSUD/wb—1/082786 —2—
currentlyalive grows at the exponential. rate 1T—X. Governments can tax the
resources not only of those private agents currently alive, but also of those
yet to be born. Their resource base grows at the exponential rate 1T+n.In
Blanchard's model, the size of the total population is non—stochastic and
constant. Weil showed that even with infinite—lived consumers, population
growth alone (n > 0) would, again by expanding the intertemporal. resource
base of the government beyond that available to those households currently
alive, destroy debt neutrality. For debt neutrality, intergenerational
linkages are necessary (say through an operative bequest motive). Infinite
horizons for "isolated" individual consumers are insufficient if n 0.
In this paper I show that A + n =0is necessary and sufficient for
debt neutrality. It follows that, as long as A + n =0,non—zero
productivity growth (iT0)does not destroy neutrality. The intuition is
that productivity growth, with A + n =0,augments equally the future
resource bases of the individual consumer and the government.
I also show that, even though the probability of death A and
population growth enter additively in the criterion for debt neutrality,
changes in A will have different effects on the economy from changes in n
(and changes in it).
Section II develops the model. Section III gives the conditions fcir
debt neutrality in a rather general way, for any pattern of Lump—sum taxaticn
over time that is consistent with government s&.vency. Section IV gives a
more detailed analysis of a specific kind of ta policy: a short—run cut in
lump—sum taxes which, over time, is transformed into a long—run increase in
lump—sum taxes. Section V uses this example to illustrate the different
effects of changes in A, n and it on the behavior of the economic system.SUD/wb—i/082786 —3—
II.The Model
A. The Individual's Consumption Behavior
I shall use the simplest version of the Yaari—Blanchard model of
consumer behavior (Yaari [1985]), Blanchard [1984, 1985]). The only novelty
is in the consideration of population growth and productivity growth in the
subsection on aggregation.




max W(s,t)=max Et Se thc(s,v)dv tS > 0
f(s,v)} f(s,v)}
Et is the expectation operator conditional on period t information; c is
individual consumption of the single good;tS is the pure rate of time
preference. During his or her lifetime each consumer faces a common and
constant instantaneous probability of death (or probability of dynastic
extinction through childlessness) X >0.The probability at time t of
surviving until time v ￿ t is therefore given by e1t). Equation (1) can





The consumer's instantaneous flow budgt identity is given by
(3) 4-(s,t)(r(t)+X) (s,t) + (s,t) —.(s,t)—SUD/wb—l/082786
—4—
ais the consumer's financial or non—human weaLth. r is the
instantaneous real interest rate, w the real wage and r lump—sum taxes net of
transfers.
The term Xa on the r.h.s of (3) reflects the operation of efficient
life insurance or annuities markets. Each consumer makes the following
contract with an insurance company: as long as he (she) lives, (s)he receives
a rate of return p on his (her) total financial asset holdings at each
instant. When (s)he dies, the entire estate accrues to the insurance
company. (If a is negative, the consumer pays the insurance company a
premium rate p, with his (her) debt cancelled when (s)he dies). The
insurance industry is competitive with free entry. There is a large number of
people (or 'cohort') born at each instant, and A is both the instantaneous
probability of death for an individual and the fraction of each cohort (and
therefore of the total population) which dies at each instant. The
competitive (zero expected) profit) rate of return paid by or to the insurance
company is therefore p =A.(Note, not p =n+A,where ri is the
instantaneous proportional population growth rate. A fraction A of each
cohort dies each instant, so a fraction A of the economy's non—human wealth
accrues to the insurance companies each instant. It is this that gets paid
out by the insurance companies to the surviving agents).
Integrating (3) forward in time and imposing the terminal boundary
condition (4), we obtain the individual househc:ld's intertemporal budget
constraint or solvency constraint given in (5a.b)
(4) urn(s,t) ef(r(u)+X)du=
— —J(r(u)+A)du — —
(5a) c(s,v) e dva (s,t) +h(s,t)SUD/wb—1/08—27—86 —5—
rv
—J (r(u)+X) du
(5b) i(s,t) f((s,v)—s,v))e dv
h is the consumer's human capital, the present discounted value (using the
"risk—adjusted" discount rate r +A)of expected future ater—tax labor
income. Note that (5b) implies:
(5b') f.i(s,t) (r(t)+X) R(s,t)—((s,t)—T(s,t))
The consumption function generated by this maximization program is
well—known to be:
(6) (s,t) =('S+x)( (s,t)+(s,t))
Equations (3.), (5b') and (6) imply
(6') E.c(s,t) =(r(t)—5)(s,t)
B.Aggregation.
At each instant a new age cohort composed of many agents is born.
The size of the cohort born at time t is (nX)ert, n ￿ 0. Since A, the
(constant) instantaneous probability of death of an agent, is also the
fraction of agents in each cohort which die at each instant, the size of the
surviving cohort at time t which was born at time s ￿ t is (n+X) ens e(t9).
Total population at any instant t is given by (n+X) et £te+n)sds =etlt
For any individual agent's stock or flow variable(s,t) we define
the corresponding population aggregate V(t) to beSUD/cqb—l/08—27—86 6 —
(7) V(t)(n+X) et I(s,t)
(n+X)sds
Each agent, regardless of age, earns the same wage income and pays
the same taxes, i.e.
(8a) (s,t) =
(8b) (s,t) =t)
Itfollows that each surviving agent has the same human capital.
(8c) (s,t) =
Bystraightforward direct computation, and using the notational
convention given in (7), aggregate consumption is given by:
(9a) C(t) =(+x)(A(t) +H(t))
(9b) A(t)r(t) ACt) +W(t)—T(t)—C(t)
(9c) H(t)(r+X+n) H(t) +T(t)—W(t)V
1/We use the fact that (t,t)=0,i.e. consumers are born without financial.
assets or liabilities.
2/ We use (t,t)e =(t)e1tSUD/wb—1/08—27—86 —7—
Theabsence of a XA term in (9b), unlike in (3), reflects the fact
that the insurance companies' activities involve a transfer from those who die
to those who survive, which does not alter the rate of return on aggregate
non—human wealth. The presence of the nH term in (9c) reflects the fact that
all surviving agents, even the newborn, have the same human capital.
There is a constant instantaneous proportional rate of growth of
productivity r. Technical change is labor—augmenting or Harrod—rieutral. By
choice of units, the level of productivity at t =0is set equal to unity.
For each population aggregate stock or flow variable V, the
corresponding quantity "per unit of labor measured in efficiency units," v, is
defined by:
(10) v(t)
Using-this notational convention, consunption per unit of efficiency
labor is governed by:
(ha) .c=
(hib) (r—(n+ir))a+w—r—c
(llc) i(r+X—i)h +t — w
These last three equations imply:
(12) =Cr—(S+it+X))c—(t5+X)na+(o+x)xh
orStJD/wb—l/082786 —8—
(12') = (r—(6+i))c —
C.Production, the public sector and market equilibrium
Production is governed by a smooth twice—continuously differentiable
neoclassical constant returns to scale production function. Capital and
efficiency units of Labor are the two inputs. Let y denote output per unit of
efficiency labor and k capital per unit of efficiency labor, then:
(13a) y = f(k); f'>O; f">O; f(O)=O; urn f'=co; urn f'O.
k-O
Competitive labor and financial markets ensure that:
(13b) r =
(13c) w = f(k) -kf'(k).
Note that w is the wage rate per unit of efficiency labor. When w is
constait, each worker's wage grows at the proportional rate ir.
Thegovernment spends on goods and services g, levies lump—sum taxes
tandborrows by issuing government debt. (g, r and b are per unit of
efficiency labor)
ifIam assuming that government spending on goods and services is neither
useful as public sector capital formation nor as public consumption in the
private utility function. g could be entered additively into the
intantaneous private utility function withoi.t affecting any of the results
(except of course the welfare economics of variations in g). For the
issue of debt neutrality, the role of g is not relevant.SUD/wb—1/08—27—86 —9—
Thegovernment's instantaneous budget identity is:
(14) bg —t+ (r—(n+n))b
Integrating the government's budget identity forward in time and
imposing the terminal, boundary condition given in (15) we obtain the familiar
government intertemporal or present value budget constraint, or its solvency
constraint, given in (16).
—f(r(u)—(n+t)du




Equilibrium in the goods market requires that:
(17)ky——g—(n+r)k
Since there are only two non—human assets, capital and government
debt, it follows that:
(18)ak+b
III. Debt (non—) Neutrality: A General Statement
It is evident from equations (11) to (18) that., given a path of gt),
variations in the government's paths or rules fcr lump—sum taxes, 'r, can only
affect current and/or future values of c, k, y, w and r by influencing private
consumption. The conditions for debt neutrality are therefore simply theSUD/wb—1/082786 —10—
conditionsfor c to be independent of the current and future vaLues of r, as
long as the path of g is left unchanged. In what follows, the analysis is
restricted to paths or ruLes for r consistent with government solvency, as
defined in (16): the present discounted value of future primary (i.e. net of
interest) government surpluses should be equal to (and therefore sufficient to
service) the initial debt. The.relevant discount rate is the real interest
rate net of the rate of growth of labor in efficiency units r—(n+ir).
Population growth and productivity growth both expand the future resource base
on which the government éan Levy taxes to serve the debt.
Integrating (lic) forward in time and imposing the terminal boundary
condition (19), we obtain human capital per unit of labor measured in






Substitute for h(t) in the consumption function (ha) using (20) and
for a(t) using (18). Then add and subtract the term
(+x) fg(v)et
)+X-)du
and rearrange. This yields:
(21) c(t)(+x) (k(t) +w(v)e1t dv)
—(+x) fg(v)e1t)—du
d';SUD/wb—1/08—27—86 —11—
+ (o+x) (b(t)-f(t(v)g(v)))et +X-dudv
The last term on the r.h.s. of (21) is the crucial one for debt
neutrality. Comparing it with the government solvency constraint (16) shows
that this last term on the r.h.s. of (21) will vanish i.f.f. X +n=0.
If A +.n *0,i.e. in practice (ignoring the case of negative population
growth) if X +n>0,debt neutrality will not hold. This is the most
general statement of the conditions for debt neutrality. What follows becomes
more specific by putting some restrictions on the paths of taxes.
Consider two economies identical in all respects except for the
initial stock of debt, which is greater in economy I, and for current and
future lump—sum taxes which differ between the two economies in such away as
to ensure government solvency for, both economy I and economy II, in spite of
the larger initial stock of debt in economy I. I.e. = =
I II I II I II II A=A=A;x =it= it; k(t) =kCt)=k(t);w (v) =w(v) =
r(v) =r(v)r(v), g (v) =g(v) =g(v)for all v ￿ t.Tomaintain
government solvency with b'(t) >b(t)we require, from (16) that
(22) b'(t) -b(t)=S(itI(v)_T(v))e_1tfr_1dv >0
Adding and subtracting the term 1(rI(v)_t (v))e1t dv
in (22) and rearrtnging yields:
(23) b'(t) -b11(t)f (r'(v)-t (v))e1t dv
+SUD/wb—1/082786 —12—
Itis clear that the higher initiaL debt in economy I could be
serviced by tax policies that have r1(v) ￿ () for
all v ￿ t and t1(v) > t11(v) for at least one finite interval of time beyond
t. For all such policies, the second term on the r.h.s. of (23) is strictly
positive for X +n> 0. It equ4ls zero for A + n =0.
Let us call this term (t), i.e.
(24) (t) =
Itis the excess of the present discounted value of the differences
in future taxes using the government's effective discount rate r—(n+-IT) over
the present discounted vaLue of the differences in future taxes using the
private sector's effective discount rate r+X—.
TFe difference in private consumption between the two economies is
given by
(25) c1(t) —cH(t) (cS+X) Q(t).
For the strictly higher path of taxes in economy I (i.e.
with r (v) ￿ -r(v) for all v and t(v)> -r(v) for some finite
interval), 2(t) is strictly positive if and only if A + n > 0, because in that
case the household sector discounts a positive stream of differences using a
higher effective discount rate than the government.
1/ This result will alo hold for many policies for which J()<rtt(v) for
some finite interval(s), but the proofs be:ome very case—specific. The
behavior of taxes in the model studied in Section IV is characterized by
r1(v) < r(v) for smalL v and t1(v) > (v) for large v.SUD/wb—1/082786 —13—
Toestablish absence of debt neutrality, we only have to show
that c (t)c (t) if b (t) *bCt) and only lump—sum taxes differ between
economies I andil to maintain government solvency. In fact we have shown
more, by establishing a strong presumption of "financial crowding out":
b1(t) >b(t)was seen to imply c'(t) >cU(t)if and only if A +n> 0 for
the class of tax policies considered. How this incipient increase in private
consumption is translated into actual behavior is very model—specific, as it
depends on the behavior of current and future expected interest rates and wage
rates. Some degree of financial crowding out seems likely, however, and the
closed economy example solved in the next section confirms this. In a small
open economy with an exogenous interest rate, the crowding out would take the
form of public debt displacing net foreign assets rather than real capital
(see Blanchard (1985) and Buiter (1986a)).
The findings of this section can be summarized as follows:
Proposition:. A +n=0is necessary and sufficient for debt
neutrality
Corollary: if A +n=0,ir* 0does not invalidate debt
neutrality.
Finally note that Blanchard's measure of fiscal stance F(t) becomes
(see Blanchard (1935)).




We have aLready discussed the third term on the r.h.s. of (26), the
financing term. The first and second term given the effect of public spendingSUD/wb—1/082786 —14—
onaggregate (private pLus public) consumption demand, at given current and
expected future interest rates and wage rates. Demand is boosted by public
consumption spending to the extent that its current value exceeds the
"permanent" value defined by the second term on the r.h.s. of (26).
IV.FinancialCrowding Out and Fiscal Policy: An Example
In this section, I complete the model of Section II by adding a
behavioral relationship for taxes which has the following properties: (1) it
almost certainly stabilizes the public debt process; (2) it pins down very
transparently the change in the long—run level of taxes and (3) a long—run
increase in taxation is preceded by a short—run cut in taxes and vice versa.
As shown in (27) r feeds back from the deficit.
(27) =t + 8b 0 <—1
Under this rule, the debt dynamics is governed by:
(28) b =(1+)1(g -r0)
+(1+ Cr-(n+r))b
In the long run (b =0),taxes are given by r0. An increase
in
it0,however,implies in the short run a reduction in itwhichdisappears
gradually and changes into an eventual increase:
(29) it= it0 + g+(r—(n+it))b
I have assumed, as I shall in .ihat follows, that r >n+ii, i.e.ti-at
the "intrinsic" debt—deficit dynamics is expLosive, because the real interestSUD/wb—1/082786 —15—
rater exceeds the long—run growth rate of the tax base, n +r.Assigning the
value —2 to 8 as was done in Buiter (1986a) results in the debt—deficit
process becoming the exact mirror image of what it would be under exogenous




The state—space representation of the model with equation (27) added
involves three state variables. One possible representation is given below in
equations (30a, b, c).. The linearization of the system around a stationary
equilibrium k0, h0 and b0 is given in (31).
(30a) k =f(k)—(s+x)(b+k+h) —g—(n+1T)k
(30b) Ii =(f'(k)+X—it)h+ y1j + g+ri(f'(k)—(n+lT))b
(30c) b =(1+e)(gt) +(l+e)1(f'(k)-(n+r))b
—+x)
k—k0
(31) b bf"(1+8)1 (r—(n+1T))(1.+G) 0 bb0
h (h+k*18b)f" -j-- (r-(n+ir)) r+X-it
h—h0SIJD/wb—1/082786 —16—














The following relations hold between the three roots o, p2, p and





(33b) b1 =p1p2 + + P2p3
(33c) b0 =p1p2p3
=det(S).I"
Thedy-namisystem in (31)has two predetermined state variables (k
and b) and one non—')redetermined state variable (h). For there to be a
1/ det(S) means determinant of the matrix S.SUD/wb—]./08—27—86 —17—
(Locally)unique continuously convergent solution to (21), the characteristic
equation (32a) should have two stable characteristic roots, and p2 say,
with negative real parts and one unstable (positive) characteristic
root, P3say.
A necessary condition for there to be the desired saddlepoint
configuration is b0det(S) >0.Since 8 <—1,the term inside the curly
brackets in (32d) should be negative. In open economy versions of this model
with perfect capital mobility, r and therefore k is fixed exogenously and the
second term inside the curly brackets of (32d) is absent. In these models the
saddlepoint condition becomes (see Blanchard (1985) and Buiter (1986a).):
(34) (r—(is+x+n+lr))(r+x—1T)(r—(n+1T)) <0




With n ￿ 0 and X 0, (35a) implies r +A—it > 0.I shall assume that (34a,
b) hold. 1"
Apositive value of b0det(S) could have been generated by three
unstable roots rather than two stable and one unstable root. Given det(S) 0,
either b2TraceS) ￿ 0 or b1 ￿ 0 is sufficient (but not necessary) for
1/ (34) could also hold if all three of r—(5+A4n+ir), r+X—ir and r—(n+it) were
negative.SUD/wb—1/08—27—86 —18—
thedesired saddlepoint configuration. It is clear from (32c) and (35a, b)
that r ￿ S+1T is sufficient for b1 <0.It can also be checked easily
that with 8 =—2,the first two terms on the r.h.s. of (32c) sum to
—[X(X++n)+n+(r—(n+r))2}. This will be negative if r >n+i.Since the last
term on the r.h.s. of (32c) is also negative, the conditions given in (35a,b)
are sufficient for the desired saddlepoint configuration if 0 =—2.









These seven equations determine the long—run equilibrium values of c,
a, h, b, k, w and r as functions of g,, X,n and .Thekey long—run
values of k andcan be solved conveniently from (36a, b).
(36a) c =(+x)((r0-g)(f(k)-(n+1T)Y1+k+(f(k)-kf'(k)-T0)(f'(k)+x-iY)
(36b) c=f(k)—g—(n+1T)k.SUD/wb—1/0827—86 —19—
Solvingthis for k as a function ofr0, g, tS, X, n and it we get
(37a) k






(37d) N =r—(S+X+n+ir)+ (S+x)f"h+k+ b
r+X—ir r—(n+ir)
From (35a, b) it follows that N < 0.
The remaining long—run multipliers will be discussed in the next
section.
Since the assumption that r > n+lr and r < n+X+rr+5 implies N < 0, it
follows that a higher long—run level of lump—sum taxes is associated with a
lower long—run capital stock (4,<0) unless n + A = 0in which case debt
neutrality prevails and the long—run capital stock is unaffected. I!
Ahigher long—run level of public consumption is associated with a
higher long—run capital stock when A + a > 0. Consider the case where X+n=G.
From equation (11') it follows that stationary equilibria with a non—zero
vaLue of c are characterized by r6+r. In that case, changes in g will not be
associated with any long—run changes in k but will simply displace an equal
amount of private consumption (see equation 36b'. Whether these are short—run
1/ Indeed the capital stock and private consumption at each instant are
unaffected if X+n0.SUDIwb—l/082786 —20—
effectson capital. formation from an increase in g when X+n=0 depends on
whether the current change in public spending is equal to or differs from the
"permanent" level fg(v)et(_dUdv (see equation 26).
Note that (37b) confirms our Proposition and its Corollary: debt
neutrality (1 =0)requires n+X0; if n+X0, rO does not destroy debt
to
neutrality. It is the difference between the public sector's future tax base
(the resources of individuals alive today or yet to be born) and the future
tax base of the individuals that are alive today (the resources owned by those
individuals only, and not the resources of individuals yet to be born) that
accounts for the non—neutrality of variations over time in the pattern of
lump—sum taxation. The individual's expected future flow of resources grows
at •a rate g—X. The government's expected future flow of resources grows at a
rate iv+n. Unless an individual is linked, through intergenerational gift and
bequest motives to all those born after himself (herself), the resources of
these future generations are not integrated into his (her) intertemporal
budget constraint. An infinite lifetime (X =0)is not the same as
intergenerational concern, nor does it imply the ability to effect the desired
intergenerational transfers of resources. Productivity growth, when n+X0,
augments the individual's resources over time in the same way as it augments
the government's tax base.
The specific "crowding out" story associated with an increase
in in our model is some intrinsic interest. Take for concreteness the case
where O=—2. From (29') it is clear'that, since rf'(k) is given at a point .n
time, an increase in long—run lump—sum taxes implies an equal and
oppositive reductioi in taxes at the initial date t0. From (28') this
generates a government deficit which is financed by borrowing. As the debt
increases taxes are raised until they exceed their initial vaLue and riseSUD/wb—l/08—27—86 —21—
beyondit to the new higher level ofr.Capitalwill be decumulated inthe
process, which will raise the interest rate. Taxes, however, respond to such
debt—service increases (see 29'). The higher taxes in the long run are
required to service the increased stock of debt due to the early deficits
associated with the early tax cut. Since the stable roots may be complex—
conjugate, the approach to the steady state may involve oscillatory
behavior. The details of the dynamic adjustment will depend on whether and
when the change in was anticipated.
The higher volume of 1-ong—run debt is associated with a long—run
capital stock (< 0in (37b)) and thus a higher interest rate. That the
long—run stock of debt is indeed higher can be seen from






b(&+X) (n+X)f"+(r—(n+) )(r+X—t)(r—+X+n+) )+(a+x )(r—(n+n) )f"(h+k+b)
This is positive given (35a, b).
Human capital faLls in the long run: r is higher, w is Lower
and r0 is higher. Consumption obviously decLines since
dc—= (r(n+t))4'<0
dt0SUD/wb—l/082786 —22—





At given izterest rates, a higher value of will raise a
if +rr>r, lower a otherwise. The decline in w as k declines reinforces
this. The endogeneityof r does, however, leave the total effect ambiguous:
+ir—r+4j da_____________________ — — I
(r+A—ir) (r—(n+Tr+S+X))
The dynamic story for the increase in g is also quite intuitive.
Spending is raised at tt0 and is kept at its new higher level. From (29'),
however, taxes are increased immediately by twice the amount of the increase
in g. A budget surplus results and debt is retired. As debt is retired,
taxes gradually (possibly in an oscillating manner) go back to their initial
value t0.Thelower debt and lower debt service (note that since k increases
in the long run, r falls) permit the higher long—run level of public spending
with unchanged long—run taxes. The exact time pattern of consumption and
capital accumulation will of couse depend on whether or not the increase in g
was anticipated, when it was anticipated etc.
V. The Long—Run Comparative Statics of the "Deep Structural" Private Sector
Parameters
Even though the population growth rate n an the probability of
death X enter the criterion for debt neutrality symmetrically, i.e. as n+X,
change in n will not affect any endogenous variable of the system in the same
wayasa change in X, unless (1) these changes are evaLuated at kn0 (andSUD/wb—l/082786 —23—
thereforeat a stationary equilibrium with rS+iT) and (2) only a subset of the
endogerious variables (k, r and w but not c, h, b and a) are considered. This
can be shown by solving for the remaining long—run reduced form derivatives of









(s+x)b +h+k)<o w r—(n+ir) r+A—ir
N,defined in (37d) is negative.
Not surprisingly, an increase in the rate of time preference, an
increase in the population growth rate and an increase in the rate of labor—
augmenting technical change all reducethe long—run capital—Labor ratio
(measured in. efficiency units). An increase in the probability of death, i.e.
a reduction in life expectancy will also reduce long—run k unless r is very
much below ir+.
—lr(r—(n+ir+S+X))b(r—(Tr+6))h Since =N t
r—(n+1T)
+—— wiltbe Larger
than 4'(i.e. will be smaller numerically) if r <i + .
Ifr >it + Sand b =0, wilt be smaLLer (numerically larger) thanSUD/wb—1/082786 —24—
Ifr >it + Sand b >0,the sign of -dependson the specific values of
the parameters.





Thus when there is debt neutrality, a small increase in A or in n
will have the same effect on k. A smaLl increase in 6 will have the same
effect on kas small increase in it.Theeffects on c of small changes
in A and n around zero will of course be quite different from each other since
in that case
6N1(b+k) > = 1(b+k)-k
dX dn
VI. Conclusion
The Yaar—Blanchard model of consumer behavior has been generalized
to allow for popuLation growth and productivity growth. Blanchard's finding,
in models without population growth and produc:ivity growth, that uncertain
lifetimes destroy debt neutrality and Weil's finding that, in a model without
uncertain lifetimes and productivity growth, population growth alone destroys
debt neutraLity, are special cases of the genetal model. If and only if theSUD/wb—1/08—2786 —25—
sumof the population growth rate and the individual's probability of death is
zero will there be debt neutrality. Non—zero productivity growth by itself
does, not destroy debt neutrality.
Note that debt neutrality, when X+n0, occurs because the government
satisfies its intertemporal present value budget constraint, i.e. because the
government is solvent in the sense defined by equation (16).It is therefore
not correct to say, if X+n0, that debt neutrality implies that the
government's tax program doesn't matter. The correct statement is that any
taxprogramthat maintains solvency doesn't matter. If solvency is
threatened, i.e. if the terminal condition that the present discounted value
(using r—(n+ir) to discount) of the debt burden (debt per unit of efficiency
labor or debt—GDP ratio) goes to zero does not hold, there will not be debt
neutrality, regardless of the value of n+X.
The analysis has been deliberately restricted to the case of lump—
sum, non—dI-stortionary taxes. Non lump—sum taxes have (dis)incentive effects
that will destroy debt neutrality even when n+X0 and the government remains
solvent. Here too, however, the Yaari—Blanchard model contributes something
new. As shown in Buiter (1986b), when there is a single "conventional"
distortion such as a non—lump—sum tax, changes in the distortionary tax rate
may have first—order income effects even when they are evaluated at a zero
value of the distortionary tax rate. This result occurs when r6+r, which can
be the case in well—behaved stationary equilibria of the Yaari—BLanchard model
if n+X*O. The discrepancy between the interest rate and the pure rate of time
preference plus :he rate of labor augmentatior. acts like a second, "intrinsic"
distortion and lands us in the realm of second—best even when there is but oie
conventional, distortion.SUD/wb—l/08-27—86 —26—
Finally,the Yaari—Blanchard model may well become the workhorse
of the late eighties for analytical macroeconomic research and teaching,
because of its simplicity and flexibility.
1/ Especially in its more complex but more general version with instantaneous
utility represented by a constant relative risk aversion function
<1.SUD/wb—1/082786 —27—
References
Blarichard, 0. J. [1984] "Current and Anticipated Deficits, Interest Rates and
Economic Activity.t' European Economic Review, 25 No. 1, June, pp. 7—
27.
Blanchard, 0. J. [1985] "Debt, Deficits and Finite Horizons." JournaL of
Political Economy, 93, April, pp. 223—47.
Buiter, W. H. [1986a1 "Fiscal. Policy in Open, Interdependent Economies," in
Economic Policy in Theory and Practice, edited by A. Razin and E.
Sadka, MacMillan, London.
Buiter, W. H. [1986b] "Structural and Stabilization Aspects of Fiscal. and
Financial Policy in the Dependent Economy," unpublished, August.
Weil, P. [1985] Essays on the Valuation of Unbacked Assets. May, Harvard
Ph.D. Thesis.
Yaari, M. E. (1965] "Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance and the Theory ofthe
Consumer," Review of Economic Studies, 32, April, pp. 137—150.The World Bank does not accept responsibility for the views expressed
herein which are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the
World Bank or to its affiliated organizations. The findings, interpretations,
and conclusions are the results of research supported by the Bank; they do not
necessarily represent official policy of the Bank. The designations employed,
the presentation of material, and any maps used in this document are solely for
the convenience of the reader and do not imply the expression of any opinion
whatsoever on the part of the World Bank of its affiliates concerning the legal
status of any country, territory, city, area, or of its authorities, or con-
cerning the delimitation of its boundaries, or national affiliation.